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APPLYING BIOETHICS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: 
PRINCIPLISM OR SITUATIONISM? 
George P. Smith, II* 
INTRODUCTION 
Living in a Nation that embraces pluralism (also referred to as relativism) 
results, for some, in an acknowledgment that no one perspective is superior 
to another in seeking resolutions to moral issues.1  Making pragmatic 
decisions conditioned and shaped from similar real-life experiences2 should 
be, on balance, the preferred ethical analytical template.  Choosing one 
theoretical and philosophical construct as a framework for decision-making 
depends largely upon an individual’s system of personal beliefs and values.  
Indeed, it has been suggested that moral beliefs are determined by cultures;3 
and thus, the “truth or falsity of an ethical claim is relative to a particular 
culture.”4 
	  
* Professor of Law, The Catholic University School of Law. LL.D., Indiana University; 
LL.M., Columbia University; J.D., B.S., Indiana University. Parts of this Article are 
drawn from my book, LAW AND BIOETHICS: INTERSECTIONS ALONG THE MORTAL COIL 
(2012). The research for and the writing of this Article were undertaken in June 2013, 
when I was a Visiting Fellow at The Lauterpacht Center, University of Cambridge, and in 
July-August 2013 when I was a Visiting Scholar at The Hesburgh Center for Civil and 
Human Rights, University of Notre Dame. This Article is dedicated—with respect, 
admiration, and appreciation—to the memory of Edmund D. Pellegrino, M.D., valued 
friend and cherished mentor from whom I learned much of the meaning of life and the 
place of Bioethics in contemporary society. 
 
         1. JONATHAN HERRING, MEDICAL ETHICS AND LAW 37 (4th ed. 2012). 
 2. Id. at 38. 
 3. Nancy S. Jecker, Applying Ethical Reasoning: Philosophical, Clinical and 
Cultural Challenges in BIOETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY, METHODS, AND 
PRACTICES 127, 130-31 (Nancy S. Jecker, Albert R. Jensen & Robert A. Pearlman eds., 
3d ed. 2012). See James Rachels, The Challenge of Cultural Relativism, in BIOETHICS: 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY, METHODS, AND PRACTICES 118 passim (Nancy S. 
Jecker, Albert R. Jonsen & Robert A. Pearlman eds., 2nd ed. 2007). 
 4. Jecker, supra note 3, at 128.   Ronald Dworkin distinguishes moral standards 
from ethical standards by defining the former as prescribing how others are treated and 
the latter as those standards by which individuals live their personal lives. Ronald 
Dworkin, What Is a Good Life?, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, (Feb. 10, 2011), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/feb/10/what-good-
life/?pagination=false&printpage=true. He acknowledges that others do not maintain this 
distinction, however, and—instead—hold that morality includes ethics and vice versa. Id. 
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It has been asserted that all cultures are infused with a central or common 
core which, in turn, is drawn essentially from the four cardinal principles of 
autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence and justice, which codify 
principlism.5  Ethical judgments are justified when they frame one of these 
four principles.6  Others contend that all four principles work in tandem—to 
one degree or other—in ethical argumentation which accords rational 
judgment.7  When a judgment is made autonomously with informed consent, 
it confers a benefit, and does not cause harm and is just or fair; it is 
efficacious.8 
As a process for moral reasoning, principlism posits that particular 
judgments are justified by moral rules which are justified by cardinal 
principles which in turn are justified, ultimately, by ethical theories.9  Ethics 
is seen as prescriptive and, consequently, directs its focus to resolving one 
central question—what ought to be?10  Whether these four principles are 
seen generally as independent principles of obligated or as in competition 
with each other has been advanced as a serious defect of principlism itself.11  
Applying one or more of the principles to any particular case is too 
discretionary and leads to a “tension-ridden dialectic.”12 
	  
See Ruth Benedict, A Defense of Ethical Relativism in BIOETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE HISTORY, METHODS, AND PRACTICES 111 passim (Nancy S. Jecker, Albert R. Jonsen, 
& Robert A. Pearlman eds., 2d ed. 2007). 
 5. Jecker, supra note 3, at 130. 
 6. Id. at 131. Indeed, such a judgment may be seen as both rational and reasonable. 
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 337 passim (8th ed. 2011). 
 7. See GEORGE P. SMITH, II, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND THE NEW MEDICINE 17-40 
(2008); GEORGE P. SMITH, II, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW: MEDICAL, SOCIO-LEGAL, AND 
PHILOSOPHICAL DIRECTIONS FOR A BRAVE NEW WORLD 6-9 (1993). 
 8. Id.  See Paul Ramsey, The Case of The Curious Exception, in NORM AND 
CONTEXT IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS (Gene H. Outka & Paul Ramsey eds., 1968) (studying 
when a justifiable violation of moral principles or moral values is allowed and concluding 
that there is only a relative distinction between principles and rules—not a clear one).  Id. 
at 74. 
 9. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 5 
(2nd ed. 1983). 
 10. Joseph Fletcher, Ethical Aspects of Genetic Controls, 285 NEW ENG. J. MED. 776 
(1971). 
 11. K. Danner Clouser & Bernard Gert, A Critique of Principlism in BIOETHICS: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY, METHODS, AND PRACTICE 153, 157 (Nancy S. Jecker, 
Albert R. Jonsen & Robert A. Pearlman eds., 2nd ed. 2007). 
 12. Daniel Callahan, Bioethics as a Discipline in BIOETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE HISTORY, METHODS, AND PRACTICES 17, 22 (Nancy S. Jecker, Albert R. Jonsen & 
Robert A. Pearlman eds., 2nd ed. 2007); see Larry Churchill, Are We Professionals? A 
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This Article will propose isolating one of the four bioethical principles—
beneficence—and reinterpreting it as the virtue of love and, as such, the sole 
criterion to determine the ethical propriety of decision-making or, the 
efficacy of, moral argumentation.  Accordingly, actions that, under any 
circumstance, exhibit a “caring response” (i.e. compassion, mercy, love, 
benevolence and common sense) should be accepted as ethical and 
rational.13  Consequently, when one’s intentions to act are anchored in love, 
they are tested by the facts of each situation which demand their application.  
Rather than being tethered to the subtleties and complexities of principlism, 
situationism requires that the policy or course of action dealing with a 
particular ethical dilemma be “tested” as to its morality (and rationality) by 
determining whether that action is undertaken with a humane and merciful 
purpose.14 
No doubt, one of the most dramatic—and today quite common—
occurrences which trigger responses and present moral dilemmas is end-of-
life care.15   To either initiate or continue treatment which is medically futile 
should be seen as unethical and, indeed, wrong.16  Such a course of action 
not only denies human finitude, but it imposes unnecessary effort, financial 
expenses, and emotional trauma on both the patient and other affected third 
parties.  When physicians attempt to treat futile medical conditions,17 such 
	  
Critical Look at the Social Role of Bioethicists, 128 DAEDALUS 253, 255 (1990) (arguing 
bioethical disputations are disregarded by “ordinary people” because they are either 
deemed as irrelevant to real issues of health care they confront and/or remote from their 
value systems). 
 13. George P. Smith, II, Refractory Pain, Existential Suffering, and Palliative Care: 
Releasing an Unbearable Lightness of Being, 20 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 469, 519 
passim (2011).  See Joseph Fletcher, Love is The Only Measure, 83 COMMONWEAL 427 
(1966). See also Michael Kirby, The New Biology and International Sharing—Lessons 
From the Life and Work of George P. Smith, II, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL STUDS. 425, 432 (2000). 
 14. See JOSEPH FLETCHER, SITUATION ETHICS: THE NEW MORALITY (1966). 
 15. George P. Smith, II, Death Be Not Proud: Medical, Ethical, and Legal Dilemmas 
in Resource Allocation, 3 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 47 (1987).  See George P. 
Smith, II, Gently Into the Good Night: Toward a Compassionate Response to End-Stage 
Illness, 22 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 101 (2013). 
 16. George P. Smith, II, Utility and The Principle of Medical Futility: Safeguarding 
Autonomy and The Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 12 J. CONTEMP. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1 (1996). 
 17. Id.  See George P. Smith, II, Terminal Sedation as Palliative Care: Revalidating 
a Right to a Good Death, 7 CAMB. Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 382 (1998). 
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actions are a total abnegation of one of the cardinal principles of medical 
ethics—beneficence.18 
I. BIOETHICS: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Historically, bioethics can be seen as having no defined essence that sets it 
apart as a distinct study or discipline.  Rather, its individuation derives from 
a de facto set of issues interrelated by what might be termed “family 
resemblance.”  While a common thread joining all of the issues is 
exceedingly difficult to find, the central core comprising the list of these 
issues—without question—is a felt concern over the technology of control 
of man’s body, his mind, and quality of life. 
In a very real sense, bioethics encompasses a whole political movement 
which seeks to harness political forces to deal with a plethora of ethical 
problems relating to health care delivery, both at the micro and the macro 
level of economic distribution.19  Consequently, many of the concerns of 
bioethics are ones of public policy—or with legislation, and policy 
guidelines at state, local and federal levels—that need to be enacted and 
enforced with respect to all of the issues comprising the de facto set.  
Bioethical concerns may be understood as those prohibitions all rational 
people urge everyone to follow in an effort to avoid evils on which common 
agreement exists. 
Outside the individual context of determining how one treats another, at 
the broader societal level of moral acceptability, a democratic consensus 
must be reached acknowledging that a certain good must be promoted, 
though its promotion causes some degree of harm elsewhere in society.  It is 
within this setting where much of what is recognized as “bioethics” is 
	  
 18. EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO & DAVID S. THOMASMA, FOR THE PATIENT’S OWN 
GOOD: THE RESTORATION OF BENEFICENCE IN HEALTH CARE (1988).  See Edmund D. 
Pellegrino, Decision at The End of Life: The Use and Abuse of The Concept of Futility in 
THE DIGNITY OF THE DYING PERSON 219, 233-35 (Juan De Dios Vial Correa & Elio 
Segreccia eds., 2000).  See also Ramsey, supra note 8. 
 19. Carl E. Schneider, Bioethics in the Language of The Law, 24 HASTINGS CENTER 
REP. 16 (1994). See DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY 
RIGHTS AND NUISANCE LAW 17 (1992) (observing that, in the distribution of resources, 
economics is concerned with efficiency instead of fairness); see also George J. Annas, 
The Dominance of American Law (And Market Values) Over American Bioethics in 
META MEDICAL ETHICS: THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION OF BIOETHICS 83-96  (Michael 
A. Grodin ed., 2001).  See also ROGER DWORKIN, LIMITS: THE ROLE OF LAW IN 
BIOETHICAL DECISION-MAKING 5-7, 11 (1997); George P. Smith, II, Biotechnology and 
The Law: Social Responsibility v. Freedom of Scientific Inquiry, 39 MERCER L. REV. 437 
(1988). 
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focused.  While individual morality operates primarily within a system of 
restraints, policies affecting society as a whole operate on a level where 
promotion of good is a moral option. The pivotal question thus becomes: 
what goods ought to be restrained (e.g., scientific research)?  Of necessity 
priorities, values, and goods must be weighed, balanced, and compared.  
Whenever the benefits and the risks of a particular course of action are 
assessed, it is well to remember that those very elements in the balancing 
test are based upon value judgments, with the ultimate goal being the 
formulation and validation of a final action, which—consistent with art 
utilitarianism—minimizes human suffering and maximizes the social good.20  
If the pace of scientific advancement is not measured and approached 
rationally, a principle of precaution may well become a principle of 
paralysis.21 
II. EXPANDING THE OUTREACH 
As a discipline or field of research and study, bioethics emerged in the 
United States in the 1960s and 1970s as an effort to assess, critically, “the 
significance of medicine in terms of its conceptual and value assumptions,”22 
and as a response to medical paternalism.23  Today, bioethics is commonly 
	  
 20. These ideas are drawn from GEORGE P. SMITH, II, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW 
supra note 7 and George P. Smith, II,  Biomedicine and Bioethics: De Lege Lata, De 
Lege Ferenda, 9 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 233, 237 (1993).  See POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 6, § 8.7; infra note 69 and the RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS test for unreasonable conduct.  See generally Norman Daniels, 
Ezekiel J. Emmanuel & Bruce Jennings, Is Justice Enough? Ends and Means in 
Bioethics, 26 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 9 (1996). 
 21. See e.g., Rob Stein & Spencer S. Hsu, Judge Blocks Stem Cell Rules, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 24, 2010, at A1.  See also George P. Smith, II, Judicial Decisionmaking in 
The Age of Biotechnology, 13 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 34 (1999); Richard 
Delgado & David R. Millin, God, Galileo, and Government: Toward Constitutional 
Protection for Scientific Inquiry, in ETHICAL, LEGAL AND SOCIAL CHALLENGES TO A 
BRAVE NEW WORLD ch. 10 (George P. Smith, II ed., 1982). 
 22. H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, JR., BIOETHICS AND SECULAR HUMANISM: THE 
SEARCH FOR A COMMON MORALITY 10 (1991).  George J. Annas argues the catalyst for 
the development of American Bioethics was the Nuremberg Doctors’ Trials after World 
War II and the Nuremberg Code. AMERICAN BIOETHICS AFTER NUREMBERG: 
PRAGMATISM, POLITICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 5 (2005). 
 23. See Laurence B. McCullough, Was Bioethics Founded on Historical and 
Conceptual Mistakes about Medical Paternalism? 25 BIOETHICS 66 (2011).  See 
generally THE STORY OF BIOETHICS (Jennifer K. Walter & Eran P. Klein eds., 2003); 
George P. Smith, II, Procreational Autonomy v. State Intervention: Opportunity or Crisis 
for a Brave New World, 2 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 635 (1986). 
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understood as focusing on ethical and legal controversies arising from the 
delivery of healthcare, the practice of medicine, and on biomedical 
research.24 
What originally were acknowledged as the three fundamental principles 
undergirding the field of bioethics—Autonomy, Beneficence, and 
Justice25—have, for some, been expanded to include one or more of the 
following: Non-Malfeasance, which holds to the premise that one held to a 
duty of care that forbids the infliction of evil, harm, or risk, or harm on 
others; Confidentiality, which imposes a standard of non-disclosure of 
information received by one person to another with the promise of its 
secrecy; Distributive Justice (refined from the earlier designation as Justice) 
to include a mandate that benefits and burdens of any medical resource 
allocation should not only be distributed equitably but that scarce resources 
be distributed fairly and—furthermore—that no one person or group receive 
a disproportionate share of either benefits or burdens; and Truth Telling, a 
principle which demands honesty and integrity in the disclosure of all 
information about an individual to that individual, himself.26 
Moving from principlism to utilitarian, Kantian theories, and Natural Law 
teachings, today, new approaches to understanding and applying bioethical 
theory have been posited. They include: narrative bioethics; virtue bioethics; 
ethics of caring; religious bioethics; casuistry; pragmatism; law and 
economic theory; critical race theory; and feminist bioethics.27  There is an 
obvious overlap among all of these approaches.  Indeed, most bioethical 
decision-making is based either on the foundational principles of this 
discipline or a combination of these approaches.28 
As bioethical principles and analytical approaches to understanding and 
applying bioethics to decision-making and policy have expanded over the 
years, so too has the scope of it as a discipline.  One such ranking of 
contemporary bioethics includes within it the study of: end of life care 
(which includes aging and dementia); genetics; research ethics; global 
	  
 24. RONALD A. LINDSAY, FUTURE BIOETHICS: OVERCOMING TABOOS, MYTHS & 
DOGMAS 19 (2008).  See generally BIOETHICS CRITICALLY RECONSIDERED: HAVING 
SECOND THOUGHTS (H. Tristram Englehardt ed., 2012). 
 25. ALBERT  R. JONSEN, THE BIRTH  OF BIOETHICS (1992). 
 26. BARRY R. FURROW, THOMAS  L. GREANEY, SANDRA H. JOHNDON, TIMOTHY S. 
JOST & ROBERT SCHWARTZ, BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 4 (6th ed. 2008).  
See generally TOM W. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL 
ETHICS (6th ed. 2009); ETHICS AND LAW FOR THE HEALTH PROFESSION chs. 1, 2, 5 (Ian 
Kerridge, Michael Lowe & Cameron Stewart eds., 3rd ed. 2009). 
 27. FURROW, supra note 26, at 11-14. 
 28. Id. at 14.  
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international health issues; cloning and stem cells; organ transplants; ethics 
of public health; feminism (i.e., commodification of female reproduction); 
technology; disability; and ecogenetics.29 In another such ranking, seven 
other activities were listed as inclusive of contemporary bioethics: patient-
centered care; evidence-based medicine and pay for performance; 
community dialogue; cross cultural concerns of race and health disparities; 
and new technologies.30  Interestingly, religion and sociobiology are both 
absent from these listings.31 
III. BENEFICENCE AND BENEVOLENCE 
The guiding norm of medicine has been the duty of beneficence.32  As a 
codified or operational principle, beneficence “prompts physicians to cite 
their moral commitments and personal support for patients beyond just 
respecting their rights” of autonomy.33 Over recent years, however, there has 
been a significant shift in reverential application of beneficence to an 
enshrinement of autonomy34—anchored, as such, in the Doctrine of 
Informed Consent—as the foundational or operative bioethical principle 
with which to comport in decision-making.35 
	  
 29. This ranking is drawn by Howard Brody from his assessment of the OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF BIOETHICS (Bonnie Steinbook ed., 2007). See generally HOWARD BRODY, 
THE FUTURE OF BIOETHICS 7 (2009). 
 30. In this list Brody enumerates the area that he thinks should be included in a 
reformulated discipline of Bioethics. Id. at 4. See generally GEORGE J. ANNAS, AMERICAN 
BIOETHICS: CROSSING HUMAN RIGHTS AND HEALTH LAW BOUNDARIES (2005). 
 31. See BRODY, supra note 29. 
 32. Edmund D. Pellegrino & David C. Thomasma, The Conflict Between Autonomy 
and Beneficence in Medical Ethics: Proposal for a Resolution, 3 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. 
& POL’Y 23 (1987). 
 33. Id. at 45. 
 34. Id. at 23.  See Tom L. Beauchamp, The Promise of Beneficence Model for 
Medical Ethics, 6 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 145, 155 (1990) (analyzing the 
tensions between autonomy and beneficence and acknowledging the moral correctness of 
Dr. Pellegrino’s argument on behalf and defense of beneficence yet asserting the 
argument is conceptually incorrect).  See generally Jay Katz, Informed Consent: Must It 
Remain a Fairy Tale, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 69 (1994). 
 35. Ultimately, bioethical perspectives or views are shaped by the very nature of the 
physician-patient relationship which, in turn, is anchored in the philosophy of medicine 
which mandates that no patient harm be done by a doctor in this partnership. See  THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF MEDICINE REBORN: A PELLEGRINO READER (H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. 
& Fabrice Jotterand eds., 2008).  See generally MARSHA GARRISON & CARL E. 
SCHNEIDER, THE LAW OF BIOETHICS: INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY  AND  SOCIAL REGULATION 
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Because of the phenomenal expansion of medical technology, which 
began in the mid-to-late twentieth century and has gained in momentum 
since the start of this century,36 new complexities in clinical care and health 
care decision-making have arisen.37  With the increased emphasis on 
economics—both micro and macro—as a central vector of force in the 
allocation of medical resources,38 conflicts have arisen between the role of 
physicians as gatekeepers to the health care delivery system and their roles 
as ethical advocates for care which best meets the needs of their patients.39 
Although the hallmark of moral debates on the use and application of 
biomedical ethics in policy and in practice, today, is that they are “unsettable 
and interminable,”40 there should be a shared commonality of purpose and 
direction within these ongoing conversations and debates. To be more 
specific, “values of patient welfare and patient autonomy . . . translate into 
the corresponding moral duties of beneficence and respect for persons.41  
Indeed, by acknowledging and embracing “the virtue of benevolence (or the 
principle of beneficence),” the integrity of “the ethical tradition of persons 
united in community” is sustained and validated since this very tradition is 
medicine’s ethical root system.42 
	  
ch. 1 (2003); George P. Smith, II, The Vagaries of Informed Consent, 1 IND. HEALTH L. 
REV. 111 (2004). 
 36. See GEORGE P. SMITH, II, THE NEW BIOLOGY: LAW, ETHICS, AND 
BIOTECHNOLOGY (1989). 
 37. Pellegrino & Thomasma, supra note 32. 
 38. See generally GEORGE P. SMITH, II, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND THE NEW 
MEDICINE (2008).  See also George P. Smith, II, Access to Health Care: Economic, 
Medical, Ethical and Socio-Legal Challenges, in HUMAN RTS. & HEALTH CARE ch. 20 
(David N. Weisstub & G. P. Pinto eds., 2008). 
 39. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Rationing Health Care: The Ethics of Medical 
Gatekeeping, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 23 (1986). 
 40. Alasdair MacIntyre, Why is the Search for the Foundations of Ethics so 
Frustrating?, 9 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 16 (1979).  See GEORGE P. SMITH, II, BIOETHICS 
AND THE LAW, supra note 7.  See also Churchill, supra note 12. 
 41. Pellegrino & Thomasma, supra note 32, at 45. 
 42. Id. at 46.  As a maximizing principle, beneficence imposes—to one degree or 
other upon each member of society—a responsibility to promote the well-being of 
everyone. Whether beneficence is morally good, but not necessarily required, is subject 
to current debate. 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 343 (Edward Craig general ed. 1998). 
Presently, beneficence and benevolence are regarded as synonyms for charity. 2 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 280-81. 
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IV. DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
Central to bioethical decision-making must be a realization that as ethical, 
socio-legal, economic and medical conflicts persist in modern society, 
controversies will continue to proliferate unabated.  Foundational issues—
such as the role of religion in tempering or even impeding the pace of 
scientific advancement and its potential for extending the limits of artificial 
reproduction and genetic advancement,43 claims of a human right to health, 
the equitable allocation of health care resources nationally, globally, and 
during times of public health emergencies, together with the extent to which 
rights of autonomy and self-determination during the end-of-life cycle—all 
guarantee a vigorous bioethical discourse.44  Central to the success or the 
failure of this dialogue is the question of what the proper foundation upon 
which informed, bioethical debates can be undertaken? Deliberative 
democracy has come into vogue, recently, and has been advanced as the 
foundation upon which this dialogue can commence.45 
With the central purpose of deliberative democracy being to promote the 
legitimacy of collective decisions,46 this concept seeks to expand both the 
number and use of deliberative forums where citizens may enter into 
discourse over the contentious issues of the new Age of Biotechnology. 
Through moral disagreements comes—ideally—a “manifest mutual respect” 
for opposing views, or in other words, mutually respectful decision-
making.47 
Deliberative democracy, viewed as but a complement to the legislative 
process, is an attractive idea. The principal drawback to its effective 
implementation is that the average, ordinary, reasonable American is not 
informed—sufficiently—to enter into meaningful discourse on the 
	  
 43. See SHEILA A. M. MCLEAN, MODERN DILEMMAS: CHOOSING  CHILDREN ch. 1 
(2006); GEORGE P. SMITH, II, GENETICS, ETHICS AND THE LAW (1981); JOHN FLETCHER, 
THE ETHICS OF GENETIC CONTROL (1974); Smith, infra note 121.  See also Tim 
Townsend, Bishops Not Indulgent on Infertility, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2010, at B12 
(reporting on a meeting of the U.S. Catholic Bishops where a document was approved 
with certain reproductive technologies, e.g., artificial insemination, being condemned as 
not morally legitimate ways to combat infertility). 
 44. See generally J. KENYON MASON & GRAEME T. LAURIE, LAW AND MEDICAL 
ETHICS (7th ed. 2006); SHEILA A.M. MCLEAN, OLD LAW, NEW MEDICINE (1998).  Ethics 
may be seen as but “reasoned public discourse in search of the common good.” 
Pellegrino & Thomasma, supra note 32, at 34. 
 45. Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Deliberating About Bioethics, 27 HASTINGS 
CENTER REP. 38 (1997). 
 46. Id. at 39. 
 47. Id. at 40. 
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ramifications of the new Age of Biotechnology.48 Logic is all too often put 
on “hold” while emotional feelings control and often resolve the debate.49 
Similarly, hard economic realities are ignored or postponed—repeatedly—
until the time their ultimate and forced implementation causes more discord 
and havoc than would have occurred if they had been considered as a first 
order priority.50 
Stated otherwise, perhaps the greatest single reason why—even with an 
ethic of openness within a deliberative democracy—little “intelligent 
conversation,” let alone constructive debate, can occur at the community 
level, is the inability of the public to understand the language of the 
scientists; or in other words, the language of statistics.51 To be sure, the 
foundations of humanity—”our sentiments, loves, attitudes, mores and 
character, as well as the familial, social, religious and political institutions 
that nourish and are nourished by them. . . .”52—are not anchored in 
scientific rationality.  Yet, conduct and decision-making must be, in a 
participatory democracy, informed and guided by a level of understanding 
which allows for reasonable courses of action. Given an unsophisticated 
citizenry as is seen today concerning issues of medical science, 
biotechnology, and finely nuanced bioethical issues, and subsequent 
paralytic legislative miasmas which often occur, it remains for the judiciary 
to recognize its ultimate responsibility to act to safeguard and promote the 
common utilitarian good.53 
	  
 48. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 112 
(1990); Smith, Judicial Decision Making, supra note 21, at 103. 
 49. See generally SUSAN JACOBY, THE AGE OF AMERICAN UNREASON (2008). 
 50. See Stephen F. Williams, Limits to Economics As a Norm for Judicial Decision, 
21 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 39 (1998). 
 51. Robert Schwartz, Genetic Knowledge: Some Legal and Ethical Questions in 
BIRTH TO DEATH: SCIENCE AND BIOETHICS 25 (David C. Thomasma & Thomasine 
Kushner eds. 1996); Roger B. Dworkin, Bioethics? The Law and Biomedical Advance, 14 
HEALTH MATRIX 43 (2004). 
 52. LEON R. KASS, LIFE, LIBERTY AND THE DEFENSE  OF DIGNITY: THE CHALLENGE OF 
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(2003). 
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V. TRADITIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL CONSTRUCTS FOR ETHICAL 
DECISION-MAKING AND MORAL REASONING 
Seen as a theory of personal morality and social justice, utilitarianism 
promotes the maximization of “the sum total of happiness.”54 Accordingly, a 
good person strives to maximize that state of happiness;55 and the good 
society is one which endeavors to accommodate this quest.56 When 
individuals are able to achieve a level of satisfaction from their preferential 
choices of whatever character or nature, and to whatever extent possible, 
then economists recognize “happiness, or utility is maximized.”57 No doubt, 
one of the inherent difficulties of utilitarianism is defining utility, or 
pleasure, and—as the case may be—disutility (or pain).58 
“Hedonistic” and “act” utilitarianism—deriving, classically, from 
consequentialist or teleological philosophies advocated by Jeremy Bentham 
and John Stuart Mill—judge actions by their hedonistic effect in achieving 
pleasure or avoidance of pain.59 Judged on a case-by-case basis, the morality 
of each act is separated “from the consequences of a potential aggregation of 
similar types of acts.”60 An act which is morally proper and causes or 
promotes a “greater net utility/happiness/pleasure than other potential acts,” 
is judged to be moral.61 
Consequentialism utilizes a common sense analytical approach in judging 
the ethical character of an action.62 Thus, the “best outcome” is one which 
results in the best consequences.63 Rather than determine certain conduct to 
be right or wrong—deontologically—consequentialism validates its efficacy 
by advancing the notion that, in practice, most people knowingly, or 
intuitively, utilize this process.64 
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Emanuel Kant’s school of moral philosophy deviated from the Bentham-
Mill thesis by stressing the importance and centrality of general rules.65 
Termed deontological, Kantian philosophy stresses the notion that “the 
principles upon which a person acts are more important than the act’s 
consequences.”66 Acts are judged to be good when they harmonize duties (or 
obligations) which derive from universal principles—with the first and 
foremost duty being that of “acting in harmony with general moral 
principles.”67 A significant issue in Kantian philosophy is that “various 
apparent duties seem to conflict with each other (e.g., a duty to be truthful 
versus “a duty to keep confidences.”)68 
More than any other Western philosophy, utilitarianism is seen as central 
to American constructs for decision-making.69  Either directly or indirectly, 
“Americans resolve apparent social dilemmas with reference to the 
comparative good and bad that they think will follow from a set of options, 
or the ‘cost/benefit’ ratio as this sometimes translates into economic 
realms.”70  In a broad sense, utilitarianism is complemented by 
communitarian ethics which stress the notion that in matters of public health 
policy making and medical research, for example, individual pursuits of 
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happiness must be compromised—or at least displaced—for the preservation 
of the common good or advancement of the general welfare.71 
There is, at best, a tenuous “link” between moral philosophy and modern 
bioethics —this, simply because average, ordinary citizens, in contemporary 
society, grapple with bioethics issues through use of theological ethics, the 
social and behavioral sciences, normative legal standards, political theory, 
and public health policies without resort to ethical theory. Theoretical 
generalities advanced by moral philosophies are largely viewed as being 
extraneous to pragmatic decision-making.72 An inherent complement to this 
decision-making model is the theory of casuistry which largely discards 
applying general principles to individual cases and—instead— analyzes the 
facts of a particular case compared and contrasted with other similar cases in 
order to resolve a conflict.73 The doctrine of precedence is central to the 
casuistical method.74 
Closely resembling casuistry is narrative ethics which considers patients 
as far more than case histories—and, instead, sees them as individuals with 
narrative histories who experience both disease and disability as elements of 
life itself.75 Both casuistry and narrative ethics place emphasis on analyzing 
concrete aspects of a case.76 
Yet, another philosophical construct for ethical decision-making is seen in 
virtue ethics which emphasize an assessment of morally correct conduct—
not the consequences of one’s actions as determinative of their 
appropriateness or correctness.77 Thus, attitudes (e.g., virtues) motivating a 
line of conduct are assessed carefully.78 Put simply, virtue ethics places more 
importance on the character of a decision maker or health care provider than 
the consequences of their action.79 
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VI. SITUATIONISM 
Drawing from the works of James Gustafson,80 Paul Ramsey,81 Paul 
Tillich,82 and others83 in the twentieth century, the late Joseph Fletcher—an 
Anglican priest—became, perhaps, the most eloquent American proponent 
of and spokesman for situationism.84 As a pragmatic and relativistic 
methodology of ethics, rather than a substantive system,85 situationism 
advances the proposition that there is but one law of love that is superior to 
and exclusive of all moral principles and laws.86 
Rather than embrace principles—although they were acknowledged as an 
ethical part of all judgment—situationists de-emphasize normative behavior 
and focus on context or “situations” as determinative.87 Accordingly, for 
Fletcher and other situationists, “the good is what works, what is expedient, 
what gives satisfaction.”88 Situationism, then, embraces a “greater good” 
morality.89 What is “good” is that which leads to “human welfare and 
happiness (but not, necessarily pleasure).”90 
Any principle can be suspended, ignored, or even violated if, by doing so, 
one “can affect more good than by following it.”91  Indeed, the very reason 
for altering principles and rules is because “circumstances” (or situations) 
warrant a common-sense and compassionate response not otherwise 
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embraced by an a priori rule.92  Love is the only norm which is “intrinsically 
good” and unalterable.93 
For Fletcher, rather than adhere totally to strict pragmatism which 
embraces the notion that the ends justify the means, the ends and the means 
are not taken as independent entities, but “are relative to each other.”94  
Thus, the means are regarded as the components necessary to a realization of 
the ends.95  Accordingly, the actual result of a course of conduct is of far less 
determinative value than the intended end96 (e.g., a compassionate response 
to end-stage pain and suffering). 
Under situationism, love is identified with justice—for, they are seen as 
“one and the same thing.”97  Love, however, defies a precise definition and 
is reached only “by an act of faith.”98  It is only through a particular situation 
that an individual is provided with ethical judgment and, in turn, it is through 
the situation that the full context of love is determined.99  Love, then, is not 
prescriptive but rather situational.100  When the law and love conflict, love 
must always triumph101  because the only universal ethical norm recognized 
is love.102  Other than the commandment, “to love God in the neighbor,”103 
situationism rejects all other norms or laws.104 
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VII. LAW’S PURPOSE 
There is general agreement that the principal purpose of law is not only to 
define and protect individual rights and to ensure public order, but also to 
resolve disputes and redistribute wealth and thereby optimize economic 
efficiency.105  Additionally, laws should dispense justice, provide a structure 
for preventing or compensating injury, and be “a lever for moving human 
behavior.”106  Accordingly, all legal systems may be viewed correctly as 
existing “to effect some change in human behavior.”107  By seeking to alter 
socio-cultural influences, law can truly shape and re-shape behavior.108 
As seen, law is the language of social regulation.109  Thus, it obeys 
systemic imperatives often irrelevant and in conflict with efforts to achieve a 
genuine understanding and wise resolution of moral issues.110  Although it 
would be incorrect to hold that every moral obligation “involves a legal 
duty,” it would, however, be proper to recognize “every legal duty is 
founded on a moral obligation.”111  It remains for the state—through the 
promulgation of laws—to determine which particular ideal of morality 
should guide.112  Ideally, and of necessity, that moral standard that best 
recognizes autonomy, and thereby “maximizes freedom” without harming 
others, must be embraced.113  As a language, law competes with other 
languages of religion and morality, of love and friendship, of custom and 
compromise, and of pragmatism and social accommodation.  Interestingly, 
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these other languages are spoken more comfortably, fluently, and with more 
conviction in daily life than the language of law.114 
VIII. SCIENCE AND RELIGION 
The two great systems of human thought are science and religion, and the 
predominant influence over the conduct of most individuals, historically, 
may be said to be religion.115  Although there is a religious perspective 
present in the lives of most individuals, religion’s stylized, institutionalized 
role has declined sharply over the years.  While traditional Christian 
doctrines are being displaced from personal consciousness, they are not 
replaced—however—by rational scientific thought; for science is just as 
elusive and inaccessible to the public as organized religions.116 
Because contemporary existence has been altered dramatically by 
scientific achievement through technology, lives are changed radically—
with the corresponding conclusion reached that traditional religions often 
appear to be lacking in modern relevance in resolving both personal and 
social problems.117  The deep questions of existence are approached 
differently by science and religion.  While science is based on careful 
observation and experimentation, which in turn allows for theories to be 
constructed connecting different experiences, religion asserts unalterable 
truths that cannot be modified to accommodate changing ideas.  
Accordingly, the true believer stands by his faith regardless of whatever 
evidence may be deduced against its efficacy.118  Yet, for the scientist, if 
scientific irregularities prove a theory to be fallacious, it will be abandoned 
and a new approach adopted.119 
The reality of social behavior is that science and technology are the great 
engines of modern times; and these engines drive and force constant change.  
Far from becoming simpler, the very real promise of science and technology 
is that they will become more difficult and, indeed, unyielding.  Finding 
definitive solutions to both the tendentious problems and the opportunities 
they present is especially difficult since no “solution” can ever be taken as 
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final— this is  because “with changing technology comes changing 
dimensions of the problems.”120 
IX. BIOETHICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
Interestingly, a distinct positive-negative, or yin-yang, relationship exists 
between science and religion that gives rise to a level of synergistic energy, 
which allows both science and religion to work independently, advancing 
the common good spiritually and scientifically.121  Similarly, there is an 
inter-relationship between bioethics and human rights—nationally and 
internationally.  More specifically, the extent to which bioethics serves as a 
framework, if perhaps not a foundation, for advancing a claim that there is a 
human right to health care122 is illustrated clearly in recent work by 
UNESCO in presenting to the United Nations a Universal Declaration on 
Bioethics and Human Rights in 2005.123  Others prefer to see human rights 
as a lingua franca for advancing a globalized notion of bioethics and one no 
longer shackled to an inflexible regime of principlism.124 
In addition to the 2005 Universal Bioethics Declaration, the 1997 
Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, and the 
2003 International Declaration on Human Genetic Data are pivotal to a new 
global effort to structure a framework to advance a bioethics/human rights 
constitutionalism.125  Together with the Universal Declaration of Human 
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Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights contain 
numerous principles and obligations which bear a direct relationship to 
norms of medical ethics.126 
X. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
As observed, another great issue of the moment confronting bioethics as a 
discipline is the issue of distributive and social justice in health care reform, 
as caution must be taken to separate the terms, “medical and health care.”  
Conflation of the two often leads to confusion—this, because health care is 
within the purview of a responsible polity, it is a much broader conception 
which must remain second in priority of concerns and action to medical 
care.127  Accordingly, primary efforts must be directed toward assuring 
treatment for those in present need of it rather than shaping a national public 
policy designed to cultivate an overall improved health status with the goal 
of preventing future illness.  Relief of suffering precedes cultivation of 
health, important as the latter surely is. 
In the final analysis, the goal of medical care must be to enhance the well-
being of the patient.128  The most vexing issue in achieving this goal is to 
both develop and to administer an equitable system of access to care that 
balances patient autonomy with quality of life—particularly when age and 
disease are more progressively incapacitating.129 Invariably, the ethics of 
medical care and of healthcare are tied, inextricably, to applying micro 
economic policy at the point of patient entry into the health care delivery 
system and macro economics in determining the rational parameters of 
	  
Declaration on Human Genetic Data may be found respectively in HEALTH AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS: BASIC INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS, supra note 123 at 78, 95.  But see GLOBAL 
BIOETHICS: THE COLLAPSE OF CONSENSUS (H. Tristram Englehardt ed., 2006). 
 126. SMITH, supra note 123; The Universal Declaration on Human Rights may be 
found at HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: BASIC INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENT, supra note 
123, at 1; The International Covenant on Economics, Social, and Cultural Rights is at 
HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: BASIC INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENT, supra note 123, at 5; 
and The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights is at HEALTH 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: BASIC INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS, supra note 123, at 13.  See 
Immaculda De Melo-Martin, Human Dignity in International Policy Documents: A 
Useful Criterion for Public Policy, 25 BIOETHICS 37 (2011). 
 127. See generally SMITH, supra note 38; PELLEGRINO & THOMASMA, supra note 18. 
 128. DAVID C. THOMASMA, HUMAN LIFE IN THE BALANCE 184 (1996). 
 129. Id. at 183. 
56 The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy Vol. XXX:1 
health care policy.130  In as much as health care resources are finite, they 
must be rationed131—with the consequence being that there can be no 
recognized or absolute duty to provide full medical treatment for all people 
at all times.132 
The extent to which medical resource allocations are provided is under 
ongoing review and assessment.  Indeed, the standard for “codifying” the 
elements of Distributive Justice is an issue of great national concern.133  
Finding an acceptable unit or metric for measurement of disease burden is 
exceedingly problematic and lacking in uniformity.  One construct growing 
in popularity for making the determination is the Quality-Adjusted Life Year 
calculation—a measurement by which the quantity of life lived is computed, 
statistically, in order to determine whether there is a sustainable value for a 
particular medical intervention.134  Cost-effectiveness, thus, is of central 
importance in this measurement.  Another tool for evaluating the use of a 
medical resource is found in a growing reliance on the practice of evidence-
based medicine, which is a systematic process of reviewing, appraising, and 
using clinical research findings to aid in the delivery of optimum clinical 
patient care.135   Thus, society continues to explore various options for 
measuring the disease burden to reasonably allocate medical resources. 
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CONCLUSION 
Once it is accepted that the provenance of the virtue of benevolence 
derives properly from the principle of beneficence,136 it can then be 
hypothesized that love should be the dominant vector of force in bioethical 
decision-making in the twenty-first century.  Accordingly, decisions should 
be guided by a spirit of rational thinking137 and basic common sense which 
seek, always, to direct a “caring response”138—or, in other words, one which 
is compassionate, loving, humane, and merciful,139 and that also recognizes 
a right to basic dignity.140 
Ethical taxonomical ambiguities should be foresworn in order to reach 
reasonable and just results.141  This approach—drawn from the notion of a 
“common morality”142—seeks to re-define rather abstruse ethical and 
philosophical principles and, thereby, reduce them to one common 
denominator: love or benevolence.  In this way, no definitive choice between 
principlism and situationism is required.  Rather, this interpretation allows 
the principle of beneficence to serve as the foundational principle upon 
which love or benevolence shape the response to individual situations in 
which ethical judgments are required.143  Moreover, in a system founded on 
benevolence, principlism and situationism are complementary and by no 
means disharmonious.  Indeed, they become inextricable in their resolve to 
serve as constructs for ethical decision-making, which is in turn rational. 
Moral theory, in and of itself, can never be the exclusive basis for moral 
judgments144 because there can be no unified criteria to test the validity of a 
moral claim. 145  Therefore, it is better to judge the morality or immorality of 
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conduct based on the situation in which an issue is raised or presented for 
review and determination.146  Inasmuch as cultural variants differ within 
each culture or community,147 morality must be viewed as community 
based—thereby defying a defined structure for problem-solving.148 
Moral relativism necessitates a casuistic (or case-based) form of analysis 
when ethical judgments must be made.  Situationism, as presented, compels 
the use of love or benevolence as the virtue of a common sense morality that 
is rational and eschews a rigid or unyielding adherence to a formalistic 
system codified in principlism.  In making this conclusion, this Article—
while recognizing that bioethics can only frame relevant questions regarding 
conflicts149—seeks to re-calibrate the “traditional” template or compass for 
ethical argumentation and, in so doing, assure an active role and relevance 
for bioethics in this century.150 
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